No. 80 Roman Theological Forum | Article Index | Study Program March 1999

THE INCOMPLETE RESPONSE OF CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS
TO THE DEMYTHOLOGIZING OF RUDOLF BULTMANN

by John F. McCarthy

Part I   -   Leopold Malevez and Heinrich Fries
 
        1. Introduction.  When Rudolf Bultmann published his well-known essay of 1941 in which he called for the "demythologizing" of the Gospels and of the New Testament as a whole, he stirred up a response that became perhaps the greatest theological debate of the twentieth century. It had its first impact within German Lutheran theological circles, but it soon spread to other Protestant thinkers. Many liberal Protestant theologians were positively impressed by Bultmann's appeal and began to argue its details. On the other hand, many traditional Protestants saw it as a menace to their faith and wrote articles against it. Thus arose what came to be called the "demythologizing debate," a discussion that continued with high interest for more than twenty years. Almost immediately after the end of the Second World War it attracted the attention of some Catholic theologians, first with the publication of shorter articles that continued to appear for decades, and then with the production of longer articles and books. A growing number of Catholic theologians found Bultmann's proposal to be interesting, and the surprising thing was that they raised no great cry of alarm about its implications. Rather, the typical article by Catholic theologians would describe in summary the contents of Bultmann's essay, often make approving remarks about various aspects of the proposal, but including no refutation except for a concluding paragraph which would point out that much of what Bultmann was affirming could not, of course, be accepted by Catholics. In the meanwhile, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, some studies by Catholic theologians appeared in the form of longer articles and books. It is these studies that concern us here. Some Catholics have the impression that the negative aspects of demythologizing no longer have any great relevance, but others have strong suspicions that the reasoning behind Bultmann's program was never adequately countered by Catholic theologians and, therefore, remains to this day an approach waiting to be systematically refuted. In fact, more and more of the ideas of Rudolf Bultmann have crept into Catholic discourse as the years have gone by, and that is all the more reason why, in an important sense, the question of demythologizing is still current today and is asking for complete rebuttal. The "demythologizing debate" as such is now past, but its negative effects are still present. It is the purpose of the following review to examine a series of typical responses given by Catholic theologians in the 1950s and 1960s, to bring out some seeming inadequacies in the approach that they took, and also to suggest some ways in which the Catholic response can be brought to completion.1

THE RESPONSE OF LEOPOLD MALEVEZ

         2. Exposition.  One of the earliest book-length studies of Bultmann's program of "demythologizing" by a Catholic writer was Leopold Malevez' Christian Message and Myth, published in the original French edition in 1954.2 The book consists of two things: a protracted attempt to describe the issues presented by Bultmann as impartially as possible and a much shorter attempt to reply to Bultmann from the viewpoint of tradition. In his reply, Malevez lists some positive features of Bultmann's approach and then criticizes its negative aspects. On the positive side, Malevez notes that Bultmann's essay of 1941 "has at least the merit of drawing the Christian's attention to the very heart of a central theme, the theme of revelation and of the Word of God, and of its incorporation into history."3 He observes that Bultmann's concern for the reformulation of the Christian message in terms more meaningful to modern man confronts all theologians with a task they must not evade.4 He points out that Bultmann's theology correctly emphasizes the principle of the existential interpretation of the Christian message, in the sense that the Christian message has to show its affinity with certain basic human hopes and longings brought to light by existential analysis, but he disagrees that such analysis need necessarily have anything to do with the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.5 As a positive reaction against liberalism, Malevez feels, Bultmann's program succeeds in retaining the elements in the theology of Karl Barth which emphasize the objective act of God in Jesus Christ while eliminating the weaknesses of Barth's absolute fideism, so as to bring the Christian message into relation with man - in his situation - and faith into relation with reason. But, in the ultimate analysis, Bultmann's insistence upon demythologizing and on a completely existential interpretation of the Christian message overreaches itself in such wise as to become a menace to the very truth that it sets out to defend.6

        3. Remarks.  In my opinion, Bultmann's theology does not correctly emphasize "the principle of the existential interpretation of the Christian message," for the simple reason that there is no such principle. The "basic hopes and longings" of modern man are brought to light, not by existential analysis, but by the teaching of the Gospel, by Christian prayer, and by searching out the objective moral sense of the inspired Word of God. Since Bultmann's program of demythologizing assumes that everything supernatural in the Gospel message is fictitious, a mere figment of the primitive religious imagination, and since Bultmann limits authentic Christian faith to the subjective experience of the believer, he can in no way be said to emphasize "the objective act of God in Jesus Christ." Thus, Bultmann's demythologizing is more than "a menace to the truth that he sets out to defend"; it is actually a total elimination of the objective truth contained in the biblical figure of the God-Man Jesus Christ. Hence, Bultmann does not really "draw the Christian's attention" to the theme of revelation except in the act of mentally dissolving that revelation into a studied focus upon one's own unenlightened subjectivity.

        4. Exposition.  The first charge that Malevez as a Christian brings against Bultmann's program is that it "has taken away his Lord," for the kerygma cannot replace the mystery of the God-Man, as Bultmann would have it do.7 Bultmann relegates the Incarnation to the realm of the mythological, but "the fact remains that Christians have always regarded it as essential to their faith. ... This is a new religion which is being proclaimed to us, which represents a break with the past, and this religion has the purely human authority of its author."8 With regard to science, Malevez maintains that Bultmann does not really speak in the name of modern science, because modern science is now aware that it cannot draw a "picture" of everything in the world. Since the competence of modern science is restricted to the definition of order in the sequence of phenomena, it cannot exclude a priori a supernatural intervention of God by which there would be visible consequences of a divine intervention which in itself would remain invisible, e.g., in the assumption of a human nature by a divine Person or in the transubstantiation of the Eucharist.9

        5. Remarks.   Malevez is basically correct in declaring that Bultmann's program proclaims "a new religion," but it does even worse than that: it proclaims an anti-religion, as all rationalist systems do, and its only act is the imaginary existentialist act of an ever-repeated "choosing of one's own self-authenticity," devoid of all objective content. A "religion" with no objective content is no religion at all. And Malevez is absolutely correct in stating that Bultmann's program has taken away the Lord, but in 1941 only as a presupposition. Bultmann had already taken away the Lord in 1921, when he published his History of the Synoptic Tradition, introducing the form-criticism of the Gospels and pretending to have eliminated the objective historical truth of every supernatural fact and event recorded in the Synoptic Gospels, including, of course, the Incarnation, the Resurrection, and the Ascension into Heaven of the God-Man Jesus Christ. Catholic historical-critics have never undertaken a systematic refutation of the fallacies embodied in Bultmann's book, especially because, having put their feet into the murky waters of the form-critical method, they lacked the will and the way.

        6. Exposition.  With regard to divine interventions in the sense of nature- miracles properly so-called, Malevez points out Bultmann's failure to see that science has no authority to set up the principle of determinism as a necessary principle of physical reality, and he corrects Bultmann's oversight with the observation that the order of nature, studied by science, has been integrated by God into another order which transcends it by encompassing it, viz., "the order of those free supernatural relations which form the link between God and the universe of spirits."10 Malevez sees the difficulty in claiming to be able to recognize exceptions to the laws of nature, when we admittedly do not even know with complete certitude what the laws of nature are. The Christian, he says, will have to concede that certain surprising events which appear to be veritable breaches in the laws of nature cannot logically be assumed to be miracles in the proper sense on those grounds alone, but, in the eyes of the Christian, they will, nevertheless, be attributed the value of authentic miracles, because from their religious context it would be seen that latent forces in nature are acting instrumentally through the action of God in response to prayers. Furthermore, according to Malevez, Bultmann's philosophical reason for excluding any intervention of God in the world is that the only kind of "objectivity" to which the philosopher as such has access is the objectivity of the existential encounter. This view limits divine action to the sphere of the existential encounter in faith, to the exclusion of any vision of "supernatural physical realities." In his philosophy, Bultmann rules out the self-standing exterior objectivity which traditional Christology has always attributed to the union of God and man. But, says Malevez, Bultmann and Heidegger have not disproved the essentialist ontology which they oppose. Malevez does not feel constrained to accept the nihilistic interpretation of Heidegger's Sein und Zeit.11

        7. Exposition.  Malevez finds that Bultmann's theological reason for excluding any divine intervention is based upon a misunderstanding of what the traditional theology of the Spirit actually holds. The traditional theology affirms that the Spirit, while being the source of divine movements and interior graces, does not disclose Himself to our methods of experimentation: the effects of his power are seen in our lives, but his actual power is still hidden from our eyes, so that only in faith can we recognize his work. The moment Bultmann admits a "presence" and a "statement" of the event to the mind and heart of the believer, he is attributing to this event the same objectivity that is accorded by traditional theology to the Master of our inward life.12 Bultmann, says Malevez, is basing his separation of God from the world of man upon an interpretation of Protestant faith which sees God as so high and humanity as fallen so low that there can be no revelation of God in our world of objects. It is an interpretation which leaves the reason of man in such shadows that faith can be founded on nothing outside of itself. But Bultmann's admission13 that sinful man is tormented by the desire for God implies that God is already present to him to some extent. Malevez advances that this immanence of God as the end of human aspirations makes possible the interior action of the Spirit. In the sinner moving towards conversion God by grace creates light for the conscience and strength for the will which are not derived from any prior phenomenon and, therefore, do represent a break in the psychological determinism of the man, but not a break in every respect, for the God from whom they proceed is antecedently installed at the heart of being, and He has created this mysterious relationship with Himself. Hence, the interior grace of the Spirit actually gives us our authentic liberty, our true personality; it gives us back to ourselves. "In truth, God enters only those in whom He dwells."14

        8. Remarks.  The primary issue is not whether Bultmann understands the traditional theology of the Holy Spirit, since Bultmann denies the objective existence of the Holy Spirit, of the Holy Trinity, and of God as an extramental object. It is true that only living faith wants to recognize the work of the Holy Spirit, but the visible effects of miracles are there, even for those non-believers who do not want to recognize them. Bultmann attributes only imaginary and preconceptual objectivity to the "presence" of the Holy Spirit. Again, Bultmann's theology does have a point of departure from a conception of the total separation of faith and reason, but to the detriment of faith inasmuch as this separation comes out as pure rationalism, that is, as total confidence in human reason to the extent of relegating the object of faith to the realm of the merely imaginary. And that sinful man is tormented by the desire for God does not imply for his theology any real presence of an objectively existing God, but only as an imaginary object which is not a true element of faith and, therefore, can be dispensed with (KaM, 183).

        9. Exposition.  Bultmann's act of demythologizing faith, says Malevez, is very much like a mythological act of faith, and its impoverished kerygma (proclamation) is destined to frustration, for it has not enough intrinsic richness of content to evoke loyalty or even interest in any school of thought, whether ancient or modern. What Bultmann forgets is that our "objective ideas" about God are the fruit of an intelligence in love with God; they indicate and signify with truth the transcendent Being.15

        10. Remarks.  Malevez rightly observes that Bultmann's act of demythologizing has no intrinsic richness of content, but it does have, unfortunately, the attractiveness of sin and error to the extent that it has, in fact, attracted an enormous amount of interest and a huge crowd of full or partial followers, not only among Protestant but also among Catholic scholars. And, in the absence over a span now of seventy-eight years of any substantial refutation of Bultmann's form-critical conclusions, in the absence over a span of fifty-eight years of a thoroughgoing rebuttal of Bultmann's theology, the dissolving power of his demythologizing has continued to wreak havoc in Catholic intellectual circles. Intelligence in love with God is an intelligence which spontaneously rejects the entire corpus of Bultmann's literary production and which works to produce a detailed and point-by-point refutation of his arguments. It is this task that the present generation of theologians is challenged to undertake and bring to completion, but this will not be accomplished without recourse to the Patristic and the neo-Patristic methods of Scriptural interpretation.

        11. Conclusion.  As the "verdict of tradition" Leopold Malevez advances four main points against the demythologizing of Bultmann:

        a) On the level of simple belief, Bultmann has taken away the Christian's Lord, for the kerygma cannot replace the mystery of the God-Man.

        b) On the level of science, Bultmann does not really speak in the name of modern science, for science is now aware that it cannot draw a picture of the world, and the profound mystery of being eludes it entirely; science has no authority to set up the principle of determinism as a necessary principle of physical reality; the order of nature has been integrated by God into the encompassing order of those free supernatural relations which form the link between God and the universe of spirits.

        c) On the level of philosophy, Bultmann rules out the self-standing exterior objectivity which traditional Christology has always attributed to the union of God and man; Bultmann and Heidegger have not disproved the essentialist ontology which they oppose.

        d) On the level of theology, Bultmann misunderstands what the traditional theology of the Spirit actually holds.

12. But Malevez makes another series of statements which weaken these points:

        a) Christians have always regarded the mystery of the God-Man as essential to their faith; this is a new religion, breaking with the past and having the purely human authority of its author.

        b) We do not know with complete certitude what the laws of nature are; certain surprising events which appear to be veritable breaches in the laws of nature cannot logically be assumed to be miracles on those grounds alone, but in the eyes of the Christian they will be attributed the value of authentic miracles, because from their religious context it would be seen that latent forces in nature are acting instrumentally through the action of God in response to prayers.

        c) Bultmann's theology correctly emphasizes the principle of the existential interpretation of the Christian message, in the sense that the Christian message has to show its affinity with certain basic human hopes and longings brought to light by existential analysis; Bultmann succeeds in retaining the elements in the theology of Karl Barth which emphasize the objective act of God in Jesus Christ and in bringing faith into relation with reason, although his insistence upon a complete existential interpretation overreaches itself so as to become a menace to the very truth that he sets out to defend.

        d) Traditional theology affirms that the effects of the Spirit are seen in our lives, but his actual power is hidden from our eyes, so that only in faith can we recognize his work; God enters only those in whom He dwells.

13. In making these second assertions Malevez plays into Bultmann's hands.

        a) Bultmann holds that the faithful have not always believed in the mystery of the God-Man. He has concluded from his form-critical research that this idea was introduced into Christian belief in the post-Palestinian era. It is Bultmann's contention that those believers who are modern men have advanced sufficiently beyond the stage of naive simplicity that they can no longer believe this dogma. But simple believers do not regard this mystery as essential to their faith, because their existientiell (I-thou) belief is concerned with something much more concrete and genuine; considering something as "essential to one's faith" is not an act of simple belief, but a theological reflection based on the philosophical concept of "essence." Bultmann retains the mystery of the God-Man in its demythologized form; this means that he accepts it as an existientiell point of departure for theological reflection, but this reflection consists in eliminating the mythological fabrication in terms of which the existential meaning of the myth is presented. Malevez does not exclude either dogmatic development or theological reflection. Therefore, an appeal to what Christians have always believed is not sufficient. Bultmann has reflected long on what is essential and what is dispensable. Malevez himself presents a notion of miracle which breaks with what the simple faithful have always believed in the past, derives from his own modern reflection, and has the purely human authority of its author. Yet, he does not accuse himself of proposing a new religion. As long as Malevez accepts in principle the validity of theological reflection that modifies what the naive believer takes for granted, he cannot on sheer principle reprove Bultmann for carrying out such a reflection.

        b) It is Bultmann's contention that what cannot be distinguished as a miracle on the level of nature is regarded in the context of belief as the act of God. What Bultmann excludes is nature-miracles. Malevez concedes the basic point by his definition of miracles. From then on the burden of proof is on Malevez to show that his idea of miracle is significantly different from that of Bultmann. Malevez, under the heading of "the verdict of tradition" ("Le jugement de la Tradition") says that Bultmann does not speak in the name of modern science. But tradition and modernity are the opposite poles of a distinction. How, then, can tradition decide what modern science is or is not? Malevez claims to be speaking in the name of tradition, but is actually speaking in the name of his own modern reflection. The fact is that Malevez has taken almost without modification the argument of Karl Jaspers, who could hardly be considered a spokesman of tradition.

        c) Once Malevez has admitted that Bultmann correctly emphasizes the principle of the existential interpretation of the Christian message, he takes upon himself the burden of showing that Bultmann and Heidegger have not disproved the essentialist ontology which they oppose. Malevez does not bring forth clear evidence to show that Bultmann's existentialist interpretation overreaches itself. The mere fact that Bultmann goes beyond Malevez is no more a proof than is the fact of Malevez' going beyond someone else a proof that Malevez' interpretation has overreached itself. Furthermore, Bultmann's principle of the existential interpretation of the Christian message is the antithesis of the traditional interpretation. How, then, can Malevez make this judgment in the name of tradition? What is this tradition to which Malevez refers? How can he be said to speak in its name? If tradition is dogma, he does not cite it. If tradition is philosophy, he himself calls it into question. If tradition is simply his viewpoint as a Catholic, how can it be called tradition? If Bultmann's existentialist approach is basically correct, has not the essentialist ontology been disproved? Malevez' argument is that Bultmann misunderstands the principles of Bultmann's theology and Heidegger misunderstands the principles of Heidegger's philosophy, but the presumption is in their favor. Does Malevez understand the principles of his own philosophy?

        d) The traditional theology of the Spirit is based on the dogma of the Blessed Trinity, which Bultmann denies. The traditional Christian affirms the existence of the Holy Spirit as a living divine Person, acting within our souls. To deny that faith sees the Holy Spirit in the sense of affirming his presence would be to concede to Bultmann. The statement "God enters only those in whom He dwells," is a vague poetic paradox which, in its ambiguity, favors the kind of reflection that Bultmann advocates.

THE RESPONSE OF HEINRICH FRIES

         14. Exposition.  In 1955 Heinrich Fries published a study of Rudolf Bultmann's approach in which he compared and contrasted the theology of Bultmann with that of Karl Barth and then added an evaluation from the viewpoint of Catholic theology.16 In formulating his response to Bultmann's challenge, he relied heavily upon the arguments of Barth, but he also used arguments of Geiselmann, Malevez, and other Catholic writers, as well as his own theological reasoning. His criticism takes the form of a rather lengthy list of short arguments against features of Bultmann's program. On the positive side, he notes that Catholic theologians cannot be grateful enough for the impetus that theology has received from Bultmann's emphasis upon its existential character. Statements about the understanding and attainment of authentic existence are made in the message of God's self-revelation in Christ, and, therefore, Bultmann's invitation to work out a process of thought which views man in the light of revelation and revelation in the light of human existence could lead to new and effective forms of confrontation between man and the word of God.17

        15. Exposition.  Fries is, however, of the opinion that, notwithstanding Bultmann's worthy intention, there are serious defects in his program, the first and most fundamental of which is what Karl Barth calls his "pre-Copernican" attitude. Bultmann would make man and man's "pre-understanding" the measure of all understanding, including the understanding of revelation and the word of God, and this is the minus sign standing in front of the whole structure of Bultmann's theology.18 And Fries agrees with Barth in asking whether Bultmann's "act of God" is not, therefore, better designated as an "act of man," 19 for by limiting the understanding of God to the measure and belief of man, Bultmann seems to be cutting the dimensions of God down to the size of man.20 Such a turning of theology into anthropology needs to be avoided, as it can be if it is realized that existential statements are but one factor of theology. Theology is focused on the Person of Christ, and the question of man should stand within this larger and more basic framework.21 Furthermore, Bultmann's stand on the viewpoint of modern science is less than critical in the sense that he says little about the dangers arising from modern science itself and from the self-understanding of modern man.22

        16. Remarks.  In my opinion, Catholic theology has been hurt by the subtleties of Bultmann's theology, but his outrageous ideas do constitute a serious challenge to Catholic theologians to produce the full Catholic response which, after the greater part of a century, is still being awaited. While the Catholic intellectual tradition has been maintaining for almost two millennia "a process of thought which views man in the light of revelation and revelation in the light of human existence," Bultmann has contributed nothing to this process except to pose problems whose correct solution could result in an expansion of Catholic theology, not in existentialist terms, but on the basis of Catholic theological tradition. An example of Bultmann's challenge is his use of the idea of pre-understanding. To make pre-understanding "the measure of all understanding" is not a minus sign in every sense. In the context of the existentialism of Martin Heidegger or the idealism of Robin Collingwood it leads to no insight, but it does invite Catholic theologians and exegetes to pay more attention to the mental frameworks that they use in arriving at conclusions. If we define "understanding" as "the knowledge of something true in terms of something else that is true," it is obvious that all understanding does derive in some sense from pre-understanding. Contemporary Catholic theologians and exegetes, especially historical critics, have not been paying enough attention to the presuppositions of their own thinking. Christian theology is indeed focused on the Person of Christ, both in his divinity and in his humanity. Therefore, the "question of man" stands in the context of the Church as the Mystical Body of Christ and of the human soul as recipient of the grace of Christ.

        17. Exposition.  Fries takes note that, from the viewpoint of Catholic theology, Bultmann overlooks two decisive factors, the one being the Bible as a self-interpreter (sui ipsius interpres) and the other being the analogy of faith (analogia fidei) contained within this self-interpretation. Bultmann completely ignores the fact that the Bible is above all a book of the Church; he does not realize that for the understanding of the Bible the interpretation and experience of the living Church is of the greatest importance.23 The Church's understanding of the Scriptures recognizes a multiple level in their meaning: behind the direct literal meaning it sees a deeper spiritual meaning.24 This obvious meaning of the New Testament is reflected in the Catholic theological concept of the "supernatural," which identifies "grace" as a new qualitative condition over against the natural and historical existence of man; it is an elevation and new creation, a participation in and partaking of the divine nature. As a supernatural quality and reality, as a free gift of the self-giving love of God, grace is not an existential, and its existential interpretation destroys it inwardly, relinquishing what is distinctively Christian in favor of merely human existence. The Catholic concept of the supernatural contains what is lacking in Bultmann's interpretation of grace, redemption, and salvation.25

        18. Remarks.  As Fries here points out, the Bible is a self-interpreter, and, to a great extent, its meaning is spontaneously grasped by the faith of the believer. Yet, to understand the Bible perfectly, and not to go astray, the guidance of the teaching Church is also needed, as well as a correct method of interpretation, such as is offered by the Patristic and the neo-Patristic approaches. On the other hand, the methods of historical-criticism tend to impede a true understanding of the inspired word.

        19. Exposition.  Fries observes that the demythologizing of Bultmann is an attempt to carry the application of the Reformation principle of "justification by faith alone" even into the sphere of knowledge. Bultmann's notion of "non-world" is an untenable point of departure for the development of a theory of myth, because, while there is no greater disparity and contrast than between God and creatures, there is also no greater proximity, community, and immanence than between God the Creator and the creature - man - in his world. Man is still an image and likeness of God. By not taking account of this relationship, Bultmann has omitted an essential element both in the reality of God and in the reality of the world.26 The authentic act of faith is, indeed, a personal one, but a sufficiency of grounds of credibility is necessary in order that the act of faith in Christ may be justified in the eyes of reason and thus become genuinely personal.27 Bultmann's demythologizing, by attempting to recast into purely existential significance everything given in the New Testament, tends to impoverish the content of faith and leads ever more towards the unreal (ins Wesenlose) - an aimless (wesenlose) existence which actually nullifies itself for the reason that it can no longer be fulfilled in itself and it can no longer fulfill anything else. This choice for or against authentic existence is based on a false alternative; the "either-or" of Bultmann is a dualism whose poles are not mutually exclusive.28

        20. Remarks.  The choice for or against "authentic existence" in the Bultmannian sense is a dualism whose poles are mutually exclusive inasmuch as the choice consists in rejecting the entire object of Christian faith as fictitious and, therefore, transferring the meaning of the act of faith to an affirmation of one's own "authentic existence" in the Heideggerian sense. The "either-or" of this false dichotomy is between believing what one does not realize to be fictitious and refusing to believe what one has discovered to be fictitious.

        21. Exposition.  Fries finds Bultmann's interpretation of the Reformation principle of the total fall of man to be contradictory. If man is that totally corrupt, as Bultmann maintains, how can so much be made to depend upon the response of man and his comprehending decision?29 The fact of the Resurrection is the center of the apostolic kerygma, and an apostle is an eminently qualified witness to the Resurrection. Bultmann's interpretation of the Resurrection stands in irreducible contradiction to the witness of Paul the Apostle, for whom the fact of the Resurrection is the clear content and object of the Easter faith.30 The New Testament presents salvation-history as a complex reality (Wirklichkeit) within whose several dimensions the "contradictions" espied by Bultmann in the text of the New Testament are completely reconcilable.31 The resolving of these alleged contradictions does not require a flight from Historie into Geschichte, for these two phenomena are not separable. It is specifically characteristic of revelation, of the saving-event and the Christ-event, that the "what-is-meaningful-for-me" in the Geschichte is so inextricably bound up with the "what-really-took place" in the Historie that the former cannot stand independently. By stressing the exclusivity of the present tense in the kerygma to the detriment of the past and the future, which have their own obvious and necessary function, by making relevant the proclaimed Christ, but not the historical Christ, Bultmann upsets the proper sequence, as Barth has pointed out, placing the "for me" in front of the "in itself" and calling the "in itself" into question. This is contrary to the obvious meaning of the text of the New Testament, the substance and center of whose Christian kerygma is the Person of Jesus Christ, his life, his death, his glorification, his mediation. These things do not derive their significance from faith and the kerygma; they receive their content and power from what is objective and what actually (tatsächlich) took place, and, therefore, their primary significance is what they are in themselves.32

        22. Remarks.  Bultmann's interpretation of the Reformation principle of the total fall of man is located on the fictitious side of the object of faith and, therefore, does not interfere with his rationalist belief in the soundness of human reason. While the "contradictions" that Bultmann claims to see in the text of the New Testament can indeed be reconciled, Catholic exegetes have not done the work required to refute the voluminous evidence that he pretends to have compiled in his exegetical works. That work remains to be accomplished. The reason why Bultmann proposed a flight in faith from the Historie of real history into the Geschichte of existentialist historicity was his contention that the real history claimed by the apostolic witness had been eliminated by historical-criticism.

        23. Exposition.  Fries concludes that Biblical revelation does not present unhistorical ideas in the guise of history, but is rather concerned specifically with the historical as what factually (faktisch) took place: the kerygma and faith of the New Testament spring from and are grounded in what factually happened. But Biblical revelation does present, and perhaps deliberately, what is historical, intensified by a supra-historical dimension in the clothing of mythical images and representations. Where myth is taken to mean the language of images, parables, and symbols, it abides together with the abstract language of conceptual science as a legitimate form of expressing what is. Myth has its rightful place at the meeting-point of man with the world and of man with the word of God.33

        24. Remarks.  Biblical revelation certainly recounts what factually took place. It is the task of this generation of theologians to restore the historical meaning of the inspired text and in the process to discover the depth of spiritual meaning that lies behind it. But myth is not just "the language of images, parables, and symbols," it is poetic fantasy, and, as such, it has nothing to do with the Gospels.

        25. Conclusion.  Heinrich Fries' book presents a long list of short and undeveloped arguments against the theology of demythologizing. If developed, they could be formidable, but they are fragile in their undeveloped form. Fries says, for instance, that Bultmann's interpretation of grace, redemption, and salvation lacks the Catholic concept of the supernatural. But, in fact, Bultmann has eliminated the Catholic concept of the supernatural in his process of thought. Hence, Fries' needs to attack Bultmann's process of thought. Again, Fries says that Bultmann does not take into account that man is an image and likeness of God, that Bultmann has omitted an essential element in the reality of God and in the reality of the world. But Bultmann does take this into account in terms of his own carefully thought out idea of analogy and of the "twofold reality" by which man and the world are distinct. Fries does not attack Bultmann's idea of the "twofold reality" or his concept of analogy. Fries says that the "either-or" of Bultmann is a dualism whose poles are not mutually exclusive, but Fries should have developed this argument further. In the absence of specific refutation, Bultmann's dualism seems to stand. Furthermore, Fries' theory of history admits of conflicting statements. On the one hand, he holds that biblical revelation is concerned specifically with the historical as "what factually took place" and that the Geschichte is so inextricably bound up with what actually took place in the Historie that the former cannot stand independently. But, on the other hand, he says that biblical revelation presents the historical intensified by a supra-historical dimension in the clothing of mythical images and representations. He could not conclude this if he has not done some "demythologizing" himself. Once he admits the principle of demythologizing, it becomes his burden to prove that Bultmann's fuller use of the same principle is an unreasonable excess.

ENDNOTES

1. For the essay which touched off the "demythologizing debate" see Rudolf Bultmann, "Neues Testament und Mythologie," in Offenbarung und Heilsgeschehen: Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie, VII/2 (Munich, 1941); reprinted in H.W. Bartsch, ed., Kerygma und Mythos (Hamburg, 1948 [henceforth referred to as KuM]); Engl. trans., H.W. Bartsch, ed., Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate, vol. I (London: SPCK, 1962 [henceforth referred to as KaM]). For a brief summary of the demythologizing debate, especially among Protestant theologians, with the relevant bibliography, see J.F. McCarthy, The Science of Historical Theology (2d printing, Rockford: TAN Books, 1991), pp. 1-5. For a brief presentation of the meaning and goal of the program of demythologizing, see McCarthy, ibid., pp. 5-14.

2. L. Malevez, Le message chrétien et le mythe. La théologie de Rudolf Bultmann (Brussels-Bruges-Paris, 1954 [henceforth referred to as MCM]); Engl. trans., The Christian Message and Myth: The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann (London: SCM Press, 1958 [henceforth referred to as CMM]).

 3. Malevez, MCM, 115 (CMM, 118).

 4. Malevez, MCM, 116 (CMM, 119).

 5. Malevez, MCM, 118-119 (CMM, 120-121).

 6. Malevez, MCM, 119-120 (CMM, 122-123).

 7. Malevez, MCM, 121 (CMM, 123-124).

 8. Malevez, MCM, 122 (CMM, 125).

 9. Malevez, MCM, 122-129 (CMM, 127-131).

 10. Malevez, MCM, 129-135 (CMM, 133-137).

 11. Malevez, MCM, 139-145 (CMM, 142-147).

 12. Malevez, MCM, 145-146 (CMM, 148).

 13. Bultmann, in KuM II, 192 (for ref. see note 1 above).

14. Malevez, MCM, 149-152 (CMM, 151-153).

 15. Malevez, MCM, 153-156 (CMM, 155-158).

 16. H. Fries, Bultmann-Barth und die katholische Theologie (Stuttgart, 1955 [henceforth referred to as BBKT]); Engl. trans., Bultmann-Barth and Catholic Theology (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1967 [henceforth referred to as BBCT]).

 17. Fries, BBKT, 137-138 (BBCT, 149-150).

 18. Fries, BBKT, 129 (BBCT, 141-142).

 19. Fries, BBKT, 136 (BBCT, 148).

 20. Fries, BBKT, 139 (BBCT, 150).

 21. Fries, BBKT, 140-141 (BBCT, 152).

 22. Fries, BBKT, 157-158 (BBCT, 167-168).

 23. Fries, BBKT, 142-143 (BBCT, 153-154).

 24. Fries, BBKT, 144 (BBCT, 155).

 25. Fries, BBKT, 149-150 (BBCT, 160-161).

 26. Fries, BBKT, 158-160 (BBCT, 168-170).

 27. Fries, BBKT, 163 (BBCT, 172-173).

 28. Fries, BBKT, 141 (BBCT, 152-153).

 29. Fries, BBKT, 150-152 (BBCT, 161-162).

 30. Fries, BBKT, 164 (BBCT, 173-174).

 31. Fries, BBKT, 142-143 (BBCT, 154).

 32. Fries, BBKT, 133-135 (BBCT, 145-147).

 33. Fries, BBKT, 167-170 (BBCT, 176-179).
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